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(57) ABSTRACT 
Systems and methods for providing device and/or device type 
fingerprinting based on properties of network traffic originat-
ing from a device to be identified. In one implementation, the 
method includes capturing packets routed through a network 
at an intermediate node between the originating device to be 
identified and destination, measuring properties of the cap-
tured traffic, including packet inter-arrival time, and generat-
ing a signature based on the measured properties that includes 
identifying information about the hardware and/or software 
architecture of the device. Various implementations do not 
require deep packet inspection, do not require a managed 
device-side client, are protocol and packet payload agnostic, 
and effective for MAC or IP-level encrypted streams. Also, 
various implementations can provide wired-side detection of 
wireless devices and device types and can detect both previ-
ously detected and unknown devices. 
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1 
SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR 
FINGERPRINTING PHYSICAL DEVICES 
AND DEVICE TYPES BASED ON NETWORK 
TRAFFIC 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application claims priority and the benefit under 35 
U.S.C. § 119( e) of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 10 
61/564,557, filed 29 Nov. 2011, the entire contents and sub-
stance of which are hereby incorporated by reference as if 
fully set forth below. 
2 
from a device and generating a signature comprising encoded 
information about the hardware and software architecture of 
the device. 
According to an example implementation, a method is 
provided. The method may include capturing network traffic 
originating from a first device and routed to a destination 
node. The network traffic may be captured at a listening node. 
The first device, destination node, and listening node may 
each be in communication with a first network. The method 
may further include measuring one or more traffic properties 
of the captured network traffic. The method may yet further 
include generating a feature vector based on at least a portion 
of the one or more measured traffic properties. The method 
BACKGROUND 15 
may also include analyzing one or more statistical properties 
of the feature vector and generating a first device signature 
based on the analyzed one or more statistical properties. The 
first device signature may comprise encoded information 
about the hardware and software architecture of the first 
One of the most significant threats to the cyber infrastruc-
ture is from insiders who have valid user credentials, e.g., 
usemame and password, to access systems and networks. 
Traditionally, network administrators have invested in fire-
walls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to 
secure the perimeter of the network in hopes of keeping an 
attacker out. However, these solutions do not stop attacks 
originating inside the network. And although host intrusion 25 
detection systems (HIDS) have been used to provide some 
defense against inside attacks, the provided defense is limited 
20 device. 
to devices for which there is a viable client application avail-
able (e.g., a compatible network access control (NAC) client), 
leaving many types of devices unmanaged and insecure. This 30 
leaves an opportunity for authorized insiders to insert unau-
thorized devices and unmanageable systems onto the net-
work, possibly for data exfiltration. Given the significant 
threat from insiders, the security of a network cannot depend 
35 
only on user authentication; rather all devices that access the 
network should have proper authorization independent of 
user authorization. 
To enable device-level authorization, robust techniques are 
needed for uniquely identifying, or fingerprinting, devices 40 
and device-types on a network. Traditional techniques like 
using Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or medium access con-
trol (MAC) addresses are insufficient because these identifi-
ers can easily be changed, or "spoofed." More recently devel-
oped techniques have improved on device and device-type 45 
fingerprinting, but these conventional techniques still suffer 
from several critical shortcomings. For example, many of 
these techniques are limited to fingerprinting only devices of 
certain device types, e.g., able to differentiate only between 
types of wireless access points (APs); are communications 50 
protocol specific, e.g., dependent on a particular feature of a 
target protocol to identify a device; or require actively prob-
ing the device to be identified, e.g., by sending malformed 
packets that can potentially alert the target device to the ID 
process. Other conventional techniques require physical pos- 55 
session or close proximity to the device to be identified, e.g., 
within RF range of the device; or require expensive signal-
analyzer hardware to be effective. Moreover, conventional 
fingerprinting techniques are generally suitable only for 
either fingerprinting a device or fingerprinting a device type, 60 
but cannot be used to discern both pieces of information. 
According to another example implementation, a com-
puter-readable medium is provided. The computer-readable 
medium may include instructions that, when executed by at 
least one processor in a system, cause the system to perform 
a method. The method may include receiving packets origi-
nating from a first device and routed to a destination node. 
The packets may be received at a listening node. The first 
device, destination node, and listening node may each be in 
communication with a first network. The method may further 
include determining one or more traffic properties of the 
packets. The method may yet further include generating a 
feature vector based on at least a portion of the one or more 
determined traffic properties. The method may also include 
analyzing one or more statistical properties of the feature 
vector and generating a first device signature based on the 
analyzed one or more statistical properties. The first device 
signature may comprise encoded information about the hard-
ware and software architecture of the first device. 
According to yet another example implementation, a 
method is provided. The method may include passively cap-
turing network traffic originating from a first device, the net-
work traffic routed over a wired segment to arrive at a desti-
nation node. The first device, destination node, and listening 
node may each be in communication with a first network. The 
network traffic may be captured by the listening node from 
the wired segment. The method may further include measur-
ing packet inter-arrival times of the captured network traffic. 
The method may yet further include generating a feature 
vector based on at least the measured packet inter-arrival 
times and analyzing one or more statistical properties of the 
feature vector. The method may also include generating a first 
device signature based on the analyzed one or more statistical 
properties. The first device signature may comprise encoded 
information about the hardware and software architecture of 
the first device. The method may still yet further include 
comparing the first device signature with one or more known 
signatures. Also, the method may include determining a type 
of the first device and an identity of the first device. The 
determining may be based on the comparing the first device 
signature with one or more known signatures. 
SUMMARY 
Some or all of the above needs may be addressed by certain 
implementations of the disclosed technology. Certain imple-
mentations may include analyzing network traffic originating 
Other implementations, features, and aspects of the dis-
closed technology are described in detail herein and are con-
sidered a part of the claimed disclosed technology. Other 
65 implementations, features, and aspects may be understood 
with reference to the following detailed description, accom-
panying drawings, and claims. 
US 9,225,732 B2 
3 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES 
Reference will now be made to the accompanying figures 
and flow diagrams, which are not necessarily drawn to scale, 
and wherein: 
FIG. 1 depicts an illustration of a block diagram of an 
example device hardware architecture, according to an 
example implementation. 
FIG. 2 depicts an illustration of a block diagram of an 
example network topology, according to an example imple-
mentation. 
FIG. 3 depicts an illustration of a plot of closeness value 
against cumulative density function for an example device 
transmitting UDP traffic, according to an example implemen-
tation. 
FIG. 4A depicts an illustration of a block diagram of an 
example isolated network topology, according to an example 
implementation. 
FIG. 4B depicts an illustration of a block diagram of an 
example campus network topology, according to an example 
implementation. 
FIG. SA depicts a plot of master size against accuracy for 
experimental results, according to an example implementa-
tion. 
4 
clear from the context to be directed to a singular form. The 
term "include" and its various forms are intended to mean 
including but not limited to. 
The behavior of packets on a network is at least partially 
determined by the hardware that generated the packets. This 
generating hardware may be unique, due to the diverse set of 
device compositions, component manufacturers, and physi-
cal differences arising from inherent variability of wire delays 
and parasitic gate delays in manufactured circuits, and clock 
10 skew. Moreover, fundamental variability in the fabrication 
process in manufactured circuits ensures that even chips pro-
duced in the same fabrication batch are different on some 
level. As information about the internal hardware of a device 
leaks into network traffic through packet behavior, some 
15 implementations of the disclosed technology can leverage 
this leakage vector to determine the unique identity of the 
device or the device's type. 
Analyzing network packet behavior to determine device 
identity is related to the process of speaker identification. Just 
20 as the hardware that generates packets influences packet 
behavior on a network, human anatomy (e.g., size and shape 
of the throat and mouth) and speech behavior (e.g., voice 
pitch, speaking style) create acoustic features of speech that 
have been found to differ between individuals. This results in 
FIG. SB depicts a plot of sample size against accuracy for 25 
experimental results, according to an example implementa-
tion. 
unique acoustic patterns and correspondingly unique voices. 
Researchers have leveraged voice uniqueness as a biometric 
identifier, creating the field of speaker recognition. 
FIGS. 6A-D depict plots of inter-arrival time against prob-
ability density function for different attack scenarios, accord-
ing to an example implementation. 
FIG. 7 depicts a flow diagram of the method, according to 
an example implementation. 
FIG. 8 depicts an illustrative block diagram of a computing 
device system architecture, according to an example imple-
mentation. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
To facilitate an understanding of the principles and features 
Speaker recognition for speaker identification may com-
prise the following: an unknown speaker vocalizes a speech 
30 utterance on which the system has been trained. Next, the 
system uses signal processing techniques to extract unique 
features from the voice signal. These techniques may vary in 
complexity since "normal" human speech can vary (e.g., 
tone, pitch, volume). The features are used as input to a 
35 classifier that intelligently acts upon the feature set and com-
pares the current feature set with speech models of known 
speakers. The unknown speaker is identified as the speaker 
whose model best matches the input utterance or is flagged if 
there is no match. 
Some implementations of the disclosed technology may be 
considered to perform a type of speaker recognition for net-
worked nodes where the node transmits a digital utterance 
(e.g., a file or response to network probes) and the node is then 
classified as either authorized or unauthorized based on the 
of implementations of the disclosed technology, various 40 
example implementations are explained below. Although 
example implementations of the disclosed technology are 
explained in detail, other implementations are contemplated. 
Further, in describing the example implementations, specific 
terminology will be resorted to for the sake of clarity. It is not 
intended that the disclosed technology be limited in scope to 
the details of construction and arrangement of components 
45 features, i.e., corresponding hardware signature, of the digital 
utterance. 
This side-charmel approach has numerous benefits over 
set forth in the following description or illustrated in the 
drawings. Rather, the disclosed technology is capable of other 
implementations and of being practiced or carried out in 50 
conventional device identification techniques that rely on 
cryptographic information generated by software clients, 
e.g., NAC clients, to identify a host device. For example, as 
some implementations of the disclosed technology do not various ways. 
Throughout the specification and the claims, the following 
terms take at least the meanings explicitly associated herein, 
unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. The term "con-
nected" means that one function, feature, structure, or char-
acteristic is directly joined to or in communication with 
another function, feature, structure, or characteristic. The 
term "coupled" means that one function, feature, structure, or 
characteristic is directly or indirectly joined to or in commu-
nication with another function, feature, structure, or charac-
teristic. Relational terms such as "first" and "second," and the 
like may be used solely to distinguish one entity or action 
from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or 
implying any actual such relationship or order between such 
entities or actions. The term "or" is intended to mean an 
inclusive "or." Further, the terms "a," "an," and "the" are 
intended to mean one or more unless specified otherwise or 
require device-side software clients to be installed, these 
implementations may be used to identify current and future 
unmanageable devices. Given the plethora of operating sys-
55 terns (OS), including OSes for seemingly benign devices such 
as printers, thermostats, cameras, etc., it is unlikely that NAC 
clients will be developed to enforce endpoint integrity for all 
IP-enabled network devices. Thus, these implementations 
may be used to identify a wide range of devices, independent 
60 of the device OS, that will remain unsecured and unidentifi-
able by conventional client-software-based NAC techniques. 
Although other non-client-based device and device-type 
fingerprinting techniques have been developed, these conven-
tional techniques are generally limited in they can be used 
65 either to fingerprint only devices or device types, but not both. 
However, there are situations where having the ability to 
effectively fingerprint both devices and device types using the 
US 9,225,732 B2 
5 
same technique is beneficial. For example, the ability to per-
form device identification and device-type identification 
enables multi-level intrusion detection. 
In a computing environment that is substantially homog-
enous, the detection of a fingerprint that is not of a certain type 
implies an intrusion. Since this determination may only 
require the comparison of the signature from the observed 
traffic to one known signature (that of the authorized type), 
fingerprinting new devices can be quicker and more efficient 
than if unique device identification was required, which may 
include comparing the input signature with signatures for 
every authorized device in the database. However, if an 
attacker uses a device of the same type authorized for use on 
the network to infiltrate the network, then a technique for 
identifying unique devices may be necessary to detect the 
intrusion. Accordingly, a single technique capable of per-
forming both identifications may provide protection in both 
scenar10s. 
Another beneficial use of a technique that provides both 
device and device type fingerprinting is to enable both offen-
sive and defensive capabilities with the same technique. In a 
scenario involving an institution with a substantially hetero-
geneous network, the ability to uniquely identify devices may 
be required to detect unauthorized nodes that have entered the 
network. However, this same institution may have interest in 
launching targeted attacks against other entities, potentially 
based on information gleaned from previously detected intru-
sion. Therefore, understanding the type of device (which may 
imply the OS and/or hardware configuration) in preparation 
for an attack may be beneficial. 
6 
disk 124) and sent to the CPU 101 for execution. The OS may 
then direct the CPU to create a buffer descriptor in main 
memory, which contains the starting memory address and 
length of the packet that is to be sent. Multiple buffer descrip-
tors may be created ifthe packet consists of multiple discon-
tiguous regions of memory. The OS may then direct the CPU 
to write information about the new buffer descriptors to a 
memory-mapped registeron the network interface card (NI C) 
141. These data may traverse the front side bus 127 through 
10 the Northbridge to the PCI bus 131. The NIC may initiate one 
or more direct memory access (DMA) transfer(s) to retrieve 
the descriptors. Then, the NIC may initiate one or more DMA 
transfer(s) to move the actual packet data from the main 
memory into its transmit buffer using the address and length 
15 information in the buffer descriptors. These data may again 
leave the front side bus, and travel to the NIC through the 
Northbridge and the PCI bus. Finally, the NIC may inform the 
OS and CPU that the descriptor has been processed. Then, the 
NIC may send the packet out onto the network 161 through its 
20 medium access control (MAC) unit. 
Assuming that the effect of the OS may be abstracted, it 
becomes apparent that the major components affecting the 
creation of packets 151 include: the CPU 101, L1 cache 
121/L2 cache 122, physical memory 123, the direct memory 
25 access (DMA) controller, the front side bus 127, the back side 
bus, the PCI bus 131, and the NIC 141. Opportunities for 
diversity occur both at the device level and at the component 
level. At the device level, different vendors may use different 
components with different capabilities and algorithms (e.g., 
30 Dell™ Latitude 2110 with Intel® Atom N470 processor @ 
1.83 GHz vs. Lenovo® G570 with Intel Core™ i5-2430 In addition to enabling a technique capable of fingerprint-
ing both devices and device types based on the same network 
traffic, some implementations of the disclosed technology 
may also provide at least the following benefits over other 
non-client-based device and device-type fingerprinting tech- 35 
processor@ 2.4 GHz) to create a device's internal architec-
ture. Accordingly, the packet creation process may vary 
across architectures. At the component level, the inherent 
variability of wire delays parasitic gate delays, device clock 
skew, and the fundamental variability in the fabrication pro-niques: 
extensibility to any networked device, both wired and wire-
less; 
protocol independence, i.e., implementations work for 
TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc., and for the applications that they 
transport; 
effective identification of devices sending encrypted net-
work traffic, including IP-level and MAC-level 
encrypted traffic streams; 
wired-side detection of wireless devices and device types; 
differentiation between distinct unknown devices; 
no deep packet inspection (DPI) required (e.g., inspecting 
timestamps, or protocol banners), thus preserving scal-
ability without compromising privacy; 
no physical possession required or close proximity to the 
identified device; and 
resilience to various attacker types, as exploiting leaked 
hardware information makes it difficult for devices to 
simulate or masquerade as other devices and device 
types. 
Referring now to the figures, in which like reference 
numerals represent like parts throughout the views, various 
implementations of the disclosed technology will be 
described in detail. 
cess in manufactured circuits may help to make the packet 
creation process unique. The architecture variations may 
enable device type identification while the component level 
40 variations may enable device identification. 
FIG. 2 depicts an illustration of a block diagram of an 
example network topology, according to an example imple-
mentation. As shown in FIG. 2A, a network 200 may com-
prise one or more wired 202 and/or wireless portions 201. A 
45 target device 211 or originating node in communication with 
the network may wirelessly transmit data over the air to an 
access point (AP) 221. The AP may forward data over its 
wired interface towards the final destination 241. A listening 
node 231 may be configured to collect, capture, or receive 
50 network traffic routed on a wired segment between the AP and 
the final destination to identify the type of wireless device. In 
some implementations, an Ethernet tap 271, the like, or 
another device, may be used to facilitate the "sniffing" of 
traffic. In another implementation, the listening node may be 
55 positioned to receive wireless signals from the target device. 
Various other network topologies are possible and consid-
ered within the scope of this disclosure. For example, in some 
implementations, the target device 211 may be in wireless 
and/or wired communication with the network. Likewise, the 
60 listening node 231 or destination node 241 may also be in 
wireless and/or wired communication with the network. The 
FIG. 1 depicts an illustration of a block diagram of an 
example device hardware architecture, according to an 
example implementation. Device packet creation can be a 
complex process that involves many internal parts of a net-
work device, or node, working in concert. In an example 
device, before a packet 151 can be sent, the instruction set that 65 
initiates the process may be extracted from the memory hier-
archy (Ll cache 121/L2 cache 122, main memory 123, hard 
network can be completely or substantially wired, wireless, 
or heterogeneous. Moreover, the destination node need not be 
the final intended destination of a packet 151. In an example 
implementation, the destination node may simply be a node 
one or more "hops" from the target device. Also, in some 
implementations, the target device 211 or originating node 
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may represent one or more devices associated with, contained 
in, or in communication with the target device. In one 
example implementation, the listening node may also be the 
destination node. Other suitable network topologies for use 
with the disclosed technology will be apparent to one of skill 
in the art. 
As shown in FIG. 2B, in some implementations, the listen-
ing node may be configured to perform additional functions. 
For example, the listening node may also be configured to 
perform one or more of feature extraction, signature genera-
tion, and similarity measure, and may comprise correspond-
ing components 251, 252, 253 or software/hardware modules 
for these processes. However, other parts of the system may 
also be configured to perform these process. In another 
example implementation, the listening node may be in com-
munication with one or more discrete nodes or devices con-
figured to perform one or more of these, or other parts, of the 
technique disclosed herein. 
8 
The time-domain method described herein is applied to the 
distribution of the IAT feature vector. Distributions may cap-
ture the frequency density of events over discrete intervals of 
time. Due to the periodic nature of network traffic, distribu-
tions can be a useful tool for traffic analysis. 
In this example, the number of measured IAT values falling 
within bins of an equal-sized interval of time is counted. The 
frequency count is divided by the total number ofIAT values 
to produce the probability distribution, p for each bin. The 
10 average IAT, µ,is calculated for each bin. The interval of time 
for a bin, or its bin width, may be represented so the edges of 
the interval for the n th bin are (binctrn-binwidth/2) and 
(binctrn+binwidth/2), where binctr is the center of the bin. 
Finally, the signature, (Q), or fingerprint of a device may be 
15 defined as: 
Q(t)~{binctr,p,µ }, (2) 
With reference to an example implementation, feature 
extraction, signature generation, and similarity measure will 20 
now be described in detail. 
where, binctr is the center of then th bin, pis probability 
distribution of then th bin, andµ is average IAT of then th bin. 
The device signature may be sensitive to the bin width and 
different bin widths may reveal different information about 
the feature vector. Smaller bin widths may cause fewer IAT 
values to occur within a particular bin, and what may appear 
to be meaningful information may really be due to random 
Feature Extraction: 
In some implementations, a feature extraction process may 
measure, determine, or record one or more traffic properties, 
or features, as network traffic is collected. The selected fea-
ture( s) for measurement should preserve the information per-
tinent to the type of device and capture discriminating prop-
erties for successful classification. For the example 
implementation described herein, packet inter-arrival time 
(IAT) is the measured feature. The use of other measure-
ments, either alone, or in combination, including, without 
limitation, packet round-trip-time (RTT) and packet size are 
considered within the scope of this disclosure. 
IAT measures the delay (1\t) between successive packets. 
Importantly, IAT characterizes packet behavior (e.g., traffic 
rate) independent of the data, or "pay load" being transported 
by the packets. Thus, using IAT and other behavioral packet 
properties affords the disclosed technique great flexibility in 
that some implementations may be packet agnostic. Accord-
ingly, these implementations may be used to effectively ana-
lyze encrypted network traffic, independent of type or proto-
col, and without the need for deep packet inspection (DPI) or 
prior knowledge about packet payload. 
In some implementations, the traffic properties may be 
measured successively in time and structured as a feature 
vector. The resulting feature vector may be a time series of 
values for passage passed to a signature generation process 
for analysis. In this example, the IAT feature vector may be 
represented as: 
(1) 
where li.t, is the inter-arrival time between packet i and i-1, 
and the first collected packet is i=O. 
Signature Generation: 
25 variations in the traffic rate. Conversely, larger bin widths 
may omit important information, aggregating information 
that might otherwise help to discriminate between two differ-
ent devices into fewer bins. Although not required, the bin 
width may be selected at least partially based on a specific or 
30 anticipated traffic type or protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP) in order 
to create a better signature representing the traffic and device. 
In some implementations, signatures for known devices 
may be generated and stored in a master signature database 
254. As traffic arrives from an unknown source, a sample 
35 signature for the new unknown device may be generated and 
compared with signatures in the master signature database to 
identify the source. 
Similarity Measure: 
Once signatures have been generated, a similarity measure 
40 may be used to compare an unknown signature with another 
signature. Various methods for determining the closeness of 
signal data are known in the art and not described at length 
herein. In this example, the following distance measure is 
used calculate the similarity between an unknown signature 
45 and a master signature: 
N 
D(x, y) = ~ {IPx(n) - Py(n)I + Py(n) * lµx(n) - µy(n)I), 
(3) 
n=l 
50 
In some implementations, the signature generation process 55 
may use statistical analysis to reveal identifying patterns 
embedded in the traffic measurements. The resulting signa-
ture may be used to fingerprint the device or device type for 
later detection or comparison. 
where N is the maximum number of bins between Qx and 
QY After comparing the unknown signature Qx with all the 
master signatures QY ={Q 1 , Q2 , Q3 , ... }, the QY that produces 
a distance, D(x, y), closest to zero is presumed the identity of 
the unknown device. D(x, y) is essentially a value of closeness 
to a master signature representing a known device. 
Example Implementations 
In this example, a time-domain method for signature gen- 60 
eration is described. However, various other statistical analy-
sis techniques may be used and are considered within the 
scope of this disclosure. For example, and not limitation, 
additional suitable statistical analysis techniques include 
using neural networks, singular value decomposition, wave- 65 
lets, etc. Other suitable statistical analysis techniques will be 
apparent to one of skill in the art. 
An example method 700 for generating a device signature 
will now be described with reference to the flow diagram of 
FIG. 7. The method 700 starts in block 702, and according to 
an example implementation, includes capturing, at a listening 
node in communication with a network, network traffic origi-
nating from a first device in communication with the network 
and routed to a destination node in communication with the 
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network. In block 704, the method 700 includes measuring 
one or more traffic properties of the captured network traffic. 
In block 706, the method 700 includes generating a feature 
vector based on at least a portion of the one or more measured 
traffic properties. In block 708, the method 700 includes 
analyzing one or more statistical properties of the feature 
vector. In block 710, the method 700 includes generating a 
first device signature based on the analyzed one or more 
statistical properties, wherein the first device signature com-
prises encoded information about the hardware and software 
architecture of the first device. According to a further imple-
mentation, the method continues in block 712 further 
includes comparing the first device signature with one or 
more known signatures. In block 714, the method 700 
includes determining, based on the comparing, a type of the 
first device and an identity of the first device. 
As explained previously, some implementations of the dis-
closed technology may compare a signature generated for a 
device in question with previously collected master signa-
tures in order to identify the device in question and/or its type. 
For instance, an example implementation may include a col-
lection of master signatures for two identical model 
Android™ Phones. In this case, there will be two master 
device IDs (Android-Phone#! and Android-Phone#2) and 
one device type (Android-Phone). Hence, given a set of mas-
10 
sample with all the master signatures, the minimum similarity 
(closeness) value (X) is determined (lines 9-10). Then, the 
logic verifies ifX is indeed within the distribution of similar-
ity values that resulted in True Positive (TP) classifications for 
previous devices compared to this device master signature 
and device type master signature. For this, the logic compares 
XwithX1,X2,X3 where XI andX2refertothe 10thand90th 
percentile of the device type TP values and X3 is the 90th 
percentile of the device TP values associated with the identi-
10 fied master (lines 13-21). If these conditions are met, the 
device and/or type are identified. Otherwise, it is labeled as 
unknown, or True Negative (TN) (i.e., not previously seen). 
FIG. 3 depicts an illustration of a plot of closeness value 
against cumulative density function for an example device 
15 transmitting UDP traffic, according to an example implemen-
tation. FIG. 3 provides a visual of sample empirical distribu-
tions used to perform this analysis. Note that the similarity 
measurement data for device type and device TP values, 
which are used to determine the values ofXl, X2, andX3 may 
20 be obtained using a separate dataset, resulting in a database of 
TP values for previously seen devices and device types. Thus, 
an example implementation may check to see if the closeness 
value fits the historic TP distributions of current master sig-
natures to determine whether a device is classified as 
25 unknown. The difference between the device TP 310 and the 
ter signatures, there would be three applicable outcomes in 
identifying a device and its type. In the first outcome, the 
implementation successfully recognizes the unknown device 
and its device type because the samples from the unknown 30 
device match either one of the master signatures of a device or 
master signatures of a device type in the signature database. In 
the second outcome, the implementation is not able to find a 
match for a given device and device type in the signature 
database. Therefore, in this case, the sample device may be 35 
classified as an unknown device. The third outcome repre-
sents a case between the first two outcomes as the implemen-
tation is able to identify the device's type, but not the actual 
device associated with the tested device. 
device type TP 320 distributions is due to heterogeneity of the 
different hardware composition (e.g., processor, DMA con-
troller, memory) of the devices as well as the intrinsic varia-
tion in the chip fabrication process. Therefore, in an example 
implementation, a tested device may be first expected to be 
closest to its own signature (Device-TP), then closest to its 
type signature (Device Type-TP), then to other devices (De-
vice-TN), assuming the existence of a match for the signature 
of the tested device. 
Experimental Results 
The performance of an example implementation of the 
disclosed technology was evaluated across three dimensions. 
First, the technique was analyzed in an isolated network envi-
ronment, as shown in FIG. 4A. Second, the performance was 
measured in in a live campus network, as shown in FIG. 4B, 
during peak hours. Third, the effectiveness of the technique 
was analyzed while under various attack scenarios in a live 
network. 
An example algorithm for comparing device signatures is 40 
presented below: 
1: Identify - ID - Type( ) 
2: begin 
3: QY,NY,IDY,TypeY ~ FetchMasters() 
4: Qx,Nx ~ CreateSamples() 
5: for i = l;i <= Nx;i ++do 
6: for j ~ l;j <~ NY;j ++do 
7: D(x,y)1 ~ MeasureSimilarity(Qj, Q/) 
8: end for 
9: X,j ~ Min(D(x,y)) 
10: IDm,Typem ~ IDy(j),Typey(j) 
11: X3 ~ TP(IDm) 
12: Xl,X2 ~ TP(Typem) 
13: if(Xl<~X<~X3)then 
14: ID~ IDm 
15: Type~ Typem 
16: else 
17: ID~U//IDisunknown 
18: if(Xl <~X<~X2)then 
19: Type~ Typem 
20: else 
21: Type~ U //Type is unknown 
22: end if 
23: end if 
24: end for 
25: return ID,Type 
26: end 
The example algorithm first measures the similarity of the 
sample unknown device (lines 6-8). After comparing a 
45 
50 
Performance Metrics: 
The performance of an example implementation was mea-
sured using accuracy and recall. Accuracy was defined as: 
TP+TN (4) 
a= ' TP+ TN+ FP+ FN 
where TP, TN, FP, and FN refer to True Positive, True 
Negative, False Positive, and False Negative, respectively. 
55 With accuracy, overall performance of the system is mea-
sured. Recall is the measure of identifying an actual device 
and is statistically defined as: 
60 
(5) 
Both accuracy and recall were used because the sole usage 
of accuracy is misleading when analyzing certain types oftest 
65 cases (e.g., for test cases that do not allow the entire cohort to 
contribute to all of the statistics). This is because accuracy, as 
shown in Equation 4, requires statistics from the entire cohort 
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of devices (i.e., TNs). This information may not be available 
for certain experiments (i.e., different protocols on one 
device). Hence, recall makes the evaluation independent of 
the impact of other TNs and yields a realistic performance 
focused only on TPs. Nonetheless, accuracy is still useful, for 
instance, in analyzing the behavior across different traffic 
types of the entire cohort. Thus, in the Performance Evalua-
tion Section, accuracy is only populated where appropriate. 
Testbed Setups: 
12 
Traffic & Signature Generation: 
Two generic applications were used to generate traffic in 
the testbeds. One was Iperf, which was used to generate both 
TCP and UDP traffic at controlled rates, and the other was 
Ping. In addition to these applications, tests were performed 
using other applications such as secure copy (SCP) and 
Skype. Each experiment generated approximately one hour 
of traffic. This resulted in 30 hours of traffic used to evaluate 
Two automated testbeds were assembled to transmit and 10 
an example implementation. The initial portion of the cap-
tured traffic (depending on the size of the master) was used for 
generating the master signatures. The remaining portion was 
split into two equal halves, out of which the first half was used 
for training and the second half was used for analysis. Spe-
record traffic from the wireless devices to a wired segment 
and vice versa. In the isolated testbed 400, as shown in FIG. 
4A, a control machine (not shown) was used to send com-
mands to the different devices in the testbed for single- and 
multiple-hop scenarios. The device under test 410 was placed 
in an isolation box 420 to reduce RF leakage and interference. 
The isolated testbed also included one or more switches 440, 
a LAN sniffer (i.e., wired listening node 231), a WLAN 
sniffer (i.e. wireless listening node 232), an access point 221 
inside another isolation box, and an ethemet tap 271. 
15 cifically, 10 different master {1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 75, 
100}xl03 and 20 different sample signature sizes {1, 2.5, 5, 
7.5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, ... , 100}xl03 were 
used in the experiments. 
FIG. SA depicts a plot of master size against accuracy for 
For the real network testbed 4SO, as shown in FIG. 4B, the 
AP 221 and local area network (LAN) destination 241 were 
connected to a campus backbone switch 470 to test the tech-
nique with real MAC and physical layer interference from 
other wireless users in proximity, during peak hours. A total 
of30 different devices (14 in the isolated testbed and 16 in the 
real network testbed) were tested and their details are listed in 
Table I and Table II, respectively. 
20 experimental results, according to an example implementa-
tion. FIG. SB depicts a plot of sample size against accuracy 
for experimental results, according to an example implemen-
tation. The best master and sample sizes for the overall per-
25 formance of the example implementation were empirically 
determined to be SOK (see FIG. SB, S20) and 2.5K (see FIG. 
SA, SlO), respectively. Thus, these signature sizes were used 
throughout the rest of the experiments. 
TABLE I 
Device Device ID Model Hardware Specification Operating System Kernel 
Netbook Dell! DELL Intel Atom N470 Ubuntu 10.04.1 LTS/ Kernel 2.6.32.24 -
Dell2 Latitude 2110 @ 1.83 GHz 1 GB RAM WindowsXP generic 
Dell 3 
Dell4 
Dell 5 
Nokia Nokia! N900 ARMv7 rev 3 (v71) Maemo 5, Version Kernel 2.6.28 -
Nokia2 @ 600 MHz 256 MB RAM 3.2010.02.8 omapl 
iPhone3G iPhone3G 1 MB715LL (A1303) A4 processor@ 1 GHz iOS 4.0 (BA293) Kernel 10.3.1 
iPhone3G 2 512MBcDRAM 
iPhone4G iPhone4G 1 MC608LL (A1332) A4 processor@ 1 GHz iOS 4.3.3 (B12) Kernel 11.0.0/ 
iPhone4G 2 512MBcDRAM Firmware 04.10.01 
iPad iPad 1 MC497LL A4 processor@ 1 GHz iOS 4.3.5 Kernel 10.3.1 
iPad 2 256 MB DDR RAM iOS 3.2.2 
iPad 3 iOS 3.2.2 
TABLE II 
Device Device ID Model Hardware Specification Operating System Kernel 
Lenovo L1 Lenovo G570 2.4 GHz Intel Core 15-2430M Ubuntu 11.04 (64 bit)/ Linux 2.6.38 - 13 -
L2 4GBRAM Windows 7 (64 bit) generic 
Dell D1 Dell Probook 4350a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 15-2430M Ubuntu 11.04 (64 bit)/ Linux 2.6.38 - 13 -
D2 4GBRAM Windows 7 (64 bit) generic 
ASUS Tablet Tl ASUS Transformer 1.0 GHz NVIDIA Tegra 2 Android 3.2.1 Kernel 2.6.36.3 
T2 TF 101 dual-core CPU 1 GB RAM 
Google Nexus G1 Nexus One 1 GHz Qualcomm QSD8250 Android 2.2 Kernel 2.6.32.9 
One G2 Processor 512 MB RAM Kernel 2.6.29 
Kindle Fire Kl Kindle Fire 1 GHz Texas Instruments OMAP Customized Android 2.3 Firmware 6.2.2 
K2 4430 dual-core processor 512 MB RAM Firmware 6.2.1 
Apple TV Al ATV !st Gen Intel Pentiwn M processor OS Version 2.0 
A2 256 MB DDR2 RAM @400 MHz based on MAC OS X 
HP Printer H1 HP Officejet RTOS 
H2 6500A Plus 
D-Link Cl D-Link DSC 932L RTOS 
IP-Camera C2 
PS3 Pl CHCH-3001A CPU Cell Processor Power PC-base Core XrossMediaBar Firmware Version 3.72 
P2 @3.2 GHz CPU RSX @550 MHz 
256 MB XDR Main RAM @3.2 GHz 
256 MB GDDR3 VRAM @700 MHz 
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Isolated Testbed Results: 
An example implementation may operate in two modes: 
known and unknown. The known mode refers to a case where 
an example implementation attempts to recognize a previ-
ously seen device among other previously seen devices and 
therefore, has a master signature associated with the device in 
question. Thus, in this case, the example implementation may 
either correctly identify the device and the device type, or 
mis-identify them. In the unknown mode of test, the example 
implementation was exposed to both devices it has previously 
seen and devices that it has not previously seen. Thus, in this 
case, the example implementation may not have the necessary 
master signature associated with a sample device tested. As a 
result, if the example implementation did not recognize a 
device, it then identified it as an unknown device, otherwise it 
identified the type and/or the device. 
The two different modes may work best for different sce-
narios. For example, in a benign network, the known mode, 
14 
which may have better accuracy and recall, can be used for 
inventory control. However, in a network where access con-
trol is a concern, the unknown mode may be superior. 
Using the accuracy (a) and recall (y) metrics, the overall 
effectiveness of the technique was measured for both modes. 
For queuing, two scenarios were tested in the isolated net-
work testbed: Single-hop and multi-hop with the results sum-
marized in Table III. For the single-hop case, the device with 
the maximum y was Netbook#5 with 99% while the device 
with the minimum y was iPhone4#2 with 56% and the average 
10 was 78% for the device identification analysis in the known 
analysis mode. For the same devices, in the unknown mode, 
the maximum, minimum, and the average fell to 96%, 42%, 
and 72%, respectively. For the device type performance, the 
maximum, minimum, and the average recall values for both 
15 known and unknown test modes were significantly higher 
than that of device identification experiments. The average 
values were 88% and 77% for the known and unknown test 
modes, respectively. 
TABLE III 
Device ID Device T e 
Dev 
Max Netbook#5 
Min Iphone4 #2 
Traffic Type 
Max UDP 1400B 1 Mbps 
Min SCP 
Avg 
Device 
Max Google Ph 2 
Mn Tablet 2 
Test Type 
Max Ping Req 1400b 
Mn TCP 
Avg 
Known UnKnown Known Unknown 
a a a a 
Type 
0.99 0.96 iPhone3 0.94 0.8 
0.56 0.42 iPhone4 0.82 0.74 
Traffic Type 
0.98 0.9 0.98 0.92 UDP 1400B 1 Mbps 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.86 
0.94 0.63 0.94 0.48 SCP 0.89 0.64 0.84 0.62 
0.97 0.78 0.96 0.72 0.96 0.88 0.89 0.76 
35 Results from Experiments on the Campus Network: 
Experiments in a live network were conducted to deter-
mine the feasibility of the technique and provide bounds for 
the performance of our technique in realistic deployments. 
General results for the campus network testbed are summa-
40 rized in Table IV. The device with the maximum y isAndroid-
Phone#2 with 70% while the device with the minimum y is 
Asus Tablet#2 with 32% and the average is 55% for the device 
identification analysis in the known operational mode. In the 
unknown mode of these devices, the maximum, minimum, 
45 and the average y fall to 58%, 24%, and 47%, respectively. On 
the other hand, for the device type performance the maxi-
mum, minimum, and the average recall values for both known 
and unknown test modes are significantly higher than that of 
device identification experiments. The average values are 
81%and65% forthe known and unknown test modes, respec-
tively. 
TABLE IV 
Device ID Device T e 
Known UnKnown Known Unknown 
a a a a 
Device Type 
0.70 0.58 eReader 0.93 0.71 
0.32 0.24 Tablet 0.67 0.57 
Test Type 
0.93 0.73 0.91 0.64 SCP 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.83 
0.83 0.35 0.81 0.29 UDP 1400B 8 Mbps 0.66 0.49 0.67 0.48 
0.87 0.55 0.85 0.47 0.88 0.81 0.80 0.65 
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Real-Time Implementation Discussion: 
Two important factors that may affect time associated with 
an example implementation's decision process are capture 
time and processing time. The capture time depends at least 
partially on the data rate and number of packets needed (i.e., 
sample size) while the processing time depends at least par-
tially on the algorithm and processing power. The time taken 
to perform the packet capture may increase linearly with an 
increase in sample size. However the processing time may 
increase at a slower rate. For example, when considering a 10 
sample size of lK packets, the capture time for an 8 Mbps 
UDP flow was 1.18 sand the corresponding processing time 
was 0.0051 s or 4.14% of the capture time. When the capture 
size was increased to SOK packets, the corresponding pro-
cessing time was 1.18 s or 1.58% of the capture time. The 15 
capture size used in this work was 2.5K packets, which had a 
capture time of3 .95 sand a corresponding processing time of 
0.12 s or 2.95% of the capture time. 
Thus, the example implementation tested was very light-
weight (e.g., 0.12 s to make a decision) as a single-threaded 20 
application when the bottleneck was the capture time. At 
higher data rates, the processing time may start to become the 
performance bottleneck. To overcome this, an example 
implementation was made multi-threaded to process arriving 
packets in parallel. For example, when the data rate was 8 25 
Mbps, for a sample size of 2.5K packets, the total processing 
time jumped to 11.49 s for a single-threaded example imple-
mentation. But, when 8 threads were used, the time was 
reduced to 6.67 s, resulting in a 45% speed up. 
16 
IATs were observed to be more distributed when compared to 
the unaltered device. One of the primary factors that pre-
vented an accurate emulation is the fact that the attacker's 
device had to simultaneously spoof a signature of a device and 
attempt to hide its innate signature. As discussed previously, 
one of the underlying theories behind the disclosed technol-
ogy is that different devices essentially "talk" differently (i.e., 
they have a different cadence), thus, as illustrated by the 
experimental results, it is difficult for even a more powerful 
device to emulate the traffic distribution of a less powerful 
device. 
FIG. 8 depicts a block diagram of an illustrative computer 
system architecture 800 according to an example implemen-
tation. Certain aspects of FIG. 8 may be embodied in a com-
puting device. Various implementations and methods herein 
may be embodied in non-transitory computer readable media 
for execution by a processor. It will be understood that the 
architecture 800 is provided for example purposes only and 
does not limit the scope of the various implementations of the 
communication systems and methods. 
The architecture 800 of FIG. 8 includes a central process-
ing unit (CPU) 802, where computer instructions are pro-
cessed; a display interface 804 that acts as a communication 
interface and provides functions for rendering video, graph-
ics, images, and texts on the display; a keyboard interface 806 
that provides a communication interface to a keyboard; and a 
pointing device interface 808 that provides a communication 
interface to a pointing device, e.g., a touchscreen or presence-
sensitive screen. Example implementations of the architec-
Attacker Models: 
The effectiveness of an example implementation was con-
sidered under a number of attack scenarios. FIGS. 6A-D 
depict plots of inter-arrival time against probability density 
function for different attack scenarios, according to an 
example implementation. Given that the example implemen-
tation was !AT-based, a novice attacker with some knowledge 
of the detection technique might consider doing one of the 
following: (1) introduce constant/random delays to packet 
stream (see FIG. 6B); (2) vary the packet size (see FIG. 6A); 
30 ture 800 may include an antenna interface 810 that provides a 
communication interface to an antenna. Example implemen-
tations may include a connection interface 812. The connec-
tion interface may include one or more of a peripheral con-
nection interface and network communication interface, 
35 providing a communication interface to an external device or 
network. According to example implementations, a random 
access memory (RAM) 818 may be provided, where com-
puter instructions and data may be stored in a volatile memory 
device for processing by the CPU 802. 
According to an example implementation, the architecture 
800 may include a read-only memory (ROM) 820 where 
invariant low-level system code or data for basic system func-
tions such as basic input and output (I/O), startup, or reception 
of keystrokes from a keyboard are stored in a non-volatile 
(3) modify/change the operating system (see FIG. 6D); (4) 40 
load the CPU with intensive applications to over shadow 
normal behavior (see FIG. 6B); (5) tunnel packets through 
another protocol (see FIG. 6A). These attacks were carried 
out in an attempt to evade the example implementation. In the 
scenario, all the devices were assumed to be known. The 
example implementation detected these attacks and classified 
45 memory device. According to an example implementation, 
the architecture 800 may include a storage medium 822 or 
other suitable type of memory (e.g. such as RAM, ROM, 
programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable pro-
grammable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically eras-
all of these devices that generated attack traffic from previ-
ously seen devices as unknown, which could be a red flag to 
a network administrator. The variation in the IAT distribution 
patterns (from normal) observed in FIGS. 6A, 6B, and 6D 
demonstrate why the example implementation was able to 
identify the attacker traffic. 
However, ifan attacker is skilled and knowledgeable of the 
technique, he might attempt to emulate an authorized device 
in order to establish/maintain network access. To do so, the 
attacker would need the distribution of the difference in the 
IAT pattern of his device and the device that he desires to 
emulate. This information can be fed into a network emula-
tion tool like netem (which is a part of linux kernel 2.6 and 
higher) to transmit packets in accordance with the distribu-
tion. When such an attack is performed, one might expect the 
attacker's device to be classified as a known device. However, 
that was not the case. FIG. 6C shows the IAT distribution 
50 able programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), mag-
netic disks, optical disks, floppy disks, hard disks, removable 
cartridges, flash drives), where the files include an operating 
system 824, application programs 826 (including, for 
example, a web browser application, a widget or gadget 
55 engine, and or other applications, as necessary) and data files 
828 are stored. According to an example implementation, the 
architecture 800 may include a power source 830 that pro-
vides an appropriate alternating current (AC) or direct current 
(DC) to power components. According to an example imple-
60 mentation, the architecture 800 may include a telephony sub-
system 832 that allows the device 800 to transmit and receive 
sound over a telephone network. The constituent devices and 
the CPU 802 may communicate with each other over a bus 
834. when the Lenovo laptop attempted to behave like a Kindle. 
Clearly, the distribution of the emulated traffic was different 65 
from the actual and the targeted device and the example 
implementation labeled this traffic as unknown. Also, the 
In accordance with an example implementation, the CPU 
802 may have appropriate structure to be a computer proces-
sor. In one arrangement, the computer CPU 802 may include 
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more than one processing unit. The RAM 818 may interface 
with the computer bus 834 to provide quick RAM storage to 
the CPU 802 during the execution of computing programs 
such as the operating system application programs, and 
device drivers. More specifically, the CPU 802 may load 
computer-executable process steps from the storage medium 
822 or other media into a field of the RAM 818 in order to 
execute computing programs. Data may be stored in the RAM 
818, where the data may be accessed by the computer CPU 
802 during execution. In one example configuration, the 
device 800 may include at least 128 MB of RAM, and 256 
MB of flash memory. 
The storage medium 822 itself may include a number of 
physical drive units, such as a redundant array of independent 
disks (RAID), a floppy disk drive, a flash memory, a USB 
flash drive, an external hard disk drive, thumb drive, pen 
drive, key drive, a High-Density Digital Versatile Disc (HD-
DVD) optical disc drive, an internal hard disk drive, a Blu-
Ray optical disc drive, or a Holographic Digital Data Storage 
(HDDS) optical disc drive, an external mini-dual in-line 
memory module (DIMM) synchronous dynamic random 
access memory (SDRAM), or an external micro-DIMM 
SDRAM. Such computer readable storage media may allow 
the device 800 to access computer-executable process steps, 
application programs and the like, stored on removable and 
non-removable memory media, to off-load data from the 
device 800 or to upload data onto the device 800. A computer 
program product, such as one utilizing a communication sys-
tem may be tangibly embodied in storage medium 822, which 
may comprise a machine-readable storage medium. 
In an example implementation of the disclosed technology, 
the mobile computing device computing system architecture 
800 may include any number of hardware and/or software 
applications that are executed to facilitate any of the opera-
tions. In an example implementation, one or more I/O inter-
faces may facilitate communication between the mobile 
device computing system architecture 800 and one or more 
input/output devices. For example, a universal serial bus port, 
a serial port, a disk drive, a CD-ROM drive, and/or one or 
more user interface devices, such as a display, keyboard, 
keypad, mouse, control panel, touchscreen display, micro-
phone, etc., may facilitate user interaction with the mobile 
device computing system architecture 800. The one or more 
I/O interfaces may be utilized to receive or collect data and/or 
user instructions from a wide variety of input devices. 
Received data may be processed by one or more computer 
processors as desired in various implementations of the dis-
closed technology and/or stored in one or more memory 
devices. 
One or more network interfaces may facilitate connection 
of the mobile device computing system architecture 800 
inputs and outputs to one or more suitable networks and/or 
connections; for example, the connections that facilitate com-
munication with any number of sensors associated with the 
system. The one or more network interfaces may further 
facilitate connection to one or more suitable networks; for 
example, a local area network, a wide area network, the 
Internet, a cellular network, a radio frequency network, a 
Bluetooth enabled network, a Wi-Fi enabled network, a sat-
ellite-based network any wired network, any wireless net-
work, a proximity network, etc., for communication with 
external devices and/or systems.As desired, implementations 
of the disclosed technology may include the mobile device 
computing system architecture 800 with more or less of the 
components illustrated in FIG. 8. 
Certain implementations of the disclosed technology are 
described above with reference to block and flow diagrams of 
18 
systems and methods and/or computer program products 
according to example implementations of the disclosed tech-
nology. It will be understood that one or more blocks of the 
block diagrams and flow diagrams, and combinations of 
blocks in the block diagrams and flow diagrams, respectively, 
may be implemented by computer-executable program 
instructions. Likewise, some blocks of the block diagrams 
and flow diagrams may not necessarily need to be performed 
in the order presented, or may not necessarily need to be 
10 performed at all, according to some implementations of the 
disclosed technology. 
These computer-executable program instructions may be 
loaded onto a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose 
computer, a processor, or other progranmiable data process-
15 ing apparatus to produce a particular machine, such that the 
instructions that execute on the computer, processor, or other 
programmable data processing apparatus create means for 
implementing one or more functions specified in the flow 
diagram block or blocks. These computer program instruc-
20 tions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that 
may direct a computer or other progranmiable data process-
ing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the 
instructions stored in the computer-readable memory pro-
duce an article of manufacture including instruction means 
25 that implement one or more functions specified in the flow 
diagram block or blocks. As an example, implementations of 
the disclosed technology may provide for a computer pro-
gram product, comprising a computer-usable medium having 
a computer-readable program code or program instructions 
30 embodied therein, said computer-readable program code 
adapted to be executed to implement one or more functions 
specified in the flow diagram block or blocks. The computer 
program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or 
other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a 
35 series of operational elements or steps to be performed on the 
computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a 
computer-implemented process such that the instructions that 
execute on the computer or other progranmiable apparatus 
provide elements or steps for implementing the functions 
40 specified in the flow diagram block or blocks. 
Accordingly, blocks of the block diagrams and flow dia-
grams support combinations of means for performing the 
specified functions, combinations of elements or steps for 
performing the specified functions and program instruction 
45 means for performing the specified functions. It will also be 
understood that each block of the block diagrams and flow 
diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams 
and flow diagrams, may be implemented by special-purpose, 
hardware-based computer systems that perform the specified 
50 functions, elements or steps, or combinations of special-pur-
pose hardware and computer instructions. 
While certain implementations of the disclosed technology 
have been described in connection with what is presently 
considered to be the most practical and various implementa-
55 tions, it is to be understood that the disclosed technology is 
not to be limited to the disclosed implementations, but on the 
contrary, is intended to cover various modifications and 
equivalent arrangements included within the scope of the 
appended claims. Although specific terms are employed 
60 herein, they are used in a generic and descriptive sense only 
and not for purposes of limitation. 
This written description uses examples to disclose certain 
implementations of the disclosed technology, including the 
best mode, and also to enable any person skilled in the art to 
65 practice certain implementations of the disclosed technology, 
including making and using any devices or systems and per-
forming any incorporated methods. The patentable scope of 
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19 
certain implementations of the disclosed technology is 
defined in the claims, and may include other examples that 
occur to those skilled in the art. Such other examples are 
intended to be within the scope of the claims if they have 
structural elements that do not differ from the literal language 
of the claims, or if they include equivalent structural elements 
with insubstantial differences from the literal language of the 
claims. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method comprising: 
capturing, at a listening node in communication with a 
network, network traffic originating from a first device 
in communication with the network and routed to a 
10 
destination node in communication with the network; 
measuring, independent of network traffic type, protocol or 15 
packet payload, one or more traffic properties of the 
captured network traffic; 
20 
determining, independent of network traffic type, protocol 
or packet payload, one or more traffic properties of the 
received packets; 
generating a feature vector based on at least a portion of the 
one or more determined traffic properties; 
analyzing one or more statistical properties of the feature 
vector; and 
generating a first device signature based on the analyzed 
one or more statistical properties, wherein the first 
device signature comprises encoded information about a 
hardware and software architecture of the first device; 
comparing the first device signature with one or more 
known signatures; and 
determining, based on the comparing, and without prior 
know ledge of the network traffic type, protocol or packet 
payload, a type of the first device and an identity of the 
first device. generating a feature vector based on at least a portion of the 
one or more measured traffic properties; 
analyzing one or more statistical properties of the feature 
vector; and 
10. The method of claim 9 further comprising determining 
20 a type of a second device, wherein: 
generating a first device signature based on the analyzed 
one or more statistical properties, wherein the first 
device signature comprises encoded information about a 
hardware and software architecture of the first device; 
comparing the first device signature with one or more 
known signatures; and 
25 
determining, based on the comparing, and without prior 
knowledge of the network traffic type, protocol or packet 
payload, a type of the first device and an identity of the 30 
first device. 
2. The method of claim 1 further comprising determining 
an identity of a second device, wherein: 
the type of the first device is determined to be a first 
unknown device type; 
the type of the second device is determined to be a second 
unknown device type; and 
the first unknown device type and second unknown device 
type are determined to be different device types. 
11. The method of claim 9, wherein the first device is in 
wireless communication with the network and the listening 
node is in wireless communication with the network. 
12. The method of claim 9 further comprising sending data 
to the first device intended to prompt the sending of one or 
more packets from the first device for capture at the listening 
node. the identity of the first device is determined to be a first 
unknown device; 
the identity of the second device is determined to be a 
second unknown device; and 
35 13. The method of claim 9, wherein the determined traffic 
properties comprise packet round-trip time. 
the first unknown device and second unknown device are 
determined to be different devices. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first device is in 40 
wireless communication with the network and the network 
traffic is routed over a wired segment to reach the destination 
node, and wherein the listening node captures the network 
traffic from the wired segment. 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the captured network 45 
traffic is at least partially encrypted. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the network comprises 
network access control and the first device does not comprise 
a network access control client compatible with the network 
access control. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the network traffic is 
passively captured. 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the measured traffic 
properties comprise packet inter-arrival time. 
50 
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the feature vector is a 55 
time series of measured values. 
9. A computer-readable medium that stores instructions 
that, when executed by at least one processor in a system, 
cause the system to perform a method comprising: 
receiving, at a listening node in communication with a 60 
network, packets routed from a first device in commu-
nication with the network and routed to a destination 
node in communication with the network; 
14. A method comprising: 
capturing, passively by a listening node in wired commu-
nication with a network, network traffic originating from 
a first device in wireless communication with the net-
work, the network traffic routed over a wired segment to 
arrive at a destination node in communication with the 
network, wherein the listening node captures the net-
work traffic from the wired segment; 
measuring, independent of network traffic type, protocol or 
packet payload, one or more traffic properties including 
packet inter-arrival times of the captured network traffic; 
generating a feature vector based on at least the one or more 
traffic properties; 
analyzing one or more statistical properties of the feature 
vector; 
generating a first device signature based on the analyzed 
one or more statistical properties, wherein the first 
device signature comprises encoded information about 
the hardware and software architecture of the first 
device; 
comparing the first device signature with one or more 
known signatures; and 
determining, based on the comparing, and without prior 
knowledge of network traffic type, protocol or packet 
payload, a type of the first device and an identity of the 
first device. 
* * * * * 
